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Abstract—In this paper we address the problem of dimen-
sioning infrastructure, comprising both network and server
resources, for large-scale decentralized distributed systems such
as grids or clouds. We will provide an overview of our work in
this area, and in particular focus on how to design the resulting
grid/cloud to be resilient against network link and/or server site
failures. To this end, we will exploit relocation: under failure
conditions, a request may be sent to an alternate destination
than the one under failure-free conditions. We will provide a
comprehensive overview of related work in this area, and focus
in some detail on our own most recent work. The latter comprises
a case study where traffic has a known origin, but we assume
a degree of freedom as to where its end up being processed,
which is typically the case for e.g., grid applications of the bag-
of-tasks (BoT) type or for providing cloud services. In particular,
we will provide in this paper a new integer linear programming
(ILP) formulation to solve the resilient grid/cloud dimensioning
problem using failure-dependent backup routes. Our algorithm
will simultaneously decide on server and network capacity. We
find that in the anycast routing problem we address, the benefit
of using failure-dependent (FD) rerouting is limited compared
to failure-independent (FID) backup routing. We confirm our
earlier findings in terms of network capacity savings achieved by
relocation compared to not exploiting relocation (order of 6–10%
in the current case studies).
I. INTRODUCTION
Easy access to powerful, and often distributed, hardware
and software resources has been of key importance for sci-
ence (e.g., the groundbreaking EGEE project [1]) as well as
business (e.g., the hosting facilities offered by Amazon.com).
As the resource offerings continue to grow and are also
coming in reach of non-professional users, we are witnessing
the emergence of a wide variety of novel applications also
targeting this audience. A common observation in all these
domains is the increasing reliance on networking, and hence
a distributed infrastructure as sketched in Fig. 1.
The resulting grid/cloud infrastructure implies the need for
efficient interworking of networking, storage and comput-
ing resources. Whereas grids mainly originated from scien-
tific/academic needs — i.e., so-called e-Science applications,
including high performance computing (HPC) — clouds man-
ifest themselves in more commercially oriented applications
(as opposed to the publicly funded research oriented grids),
which often involve loosely coupled tasks, and are typically
interactive [3]. In terms of infrastructure, they typically run
in large data centers (as opposed to HPC infrastructures for
Fig. 1. Various types of users can tap into a resource rich optical grid/cloud
environment, offering infrastructural resources (storage, computation and
connectivity) and information (e.g., experimental data). Optical technology
provides the high bandwidth connectivity to facilitate advanced application
scenarios. (Reproduced from [2].)
many grid applications). It is clear that, given the increased
popularity of such infrastructure, reliability is a prime concern.
In the considered grid/cloud applications, this applies to both
the network and IT resources for storage and computation.
Whereas various approaches have been defined in each of these
domains (network vs. IT) separately, their interdependency
needs to be kept in mind to successfully deploy resilient
grids/clouds.
In this paper, we particularly focus on jointly optimizing
network and data center server capacities in a dimensioning
study. Hereby, on the network part, we focus on the backbone
network, which we assume to be an optical circuit-switched
WDM network. Indeed, given their low latency and high ca-
pacity characteristics, optical technologies are a prime choice
to support grids/clouds [2]. To deal with potential network fail-
ures, various network resilience strategies for WDM networks
have been devised [4]. A well-known classical path protection
scheme protects a primary path from source to destination
by a link-disjoint backup path which is used in case of a
failing link (this link diversity guarantees that the primary and
backup paths will never fail simultaneously for any single link
failure). In a grid/cloud-like scenario however, we proposed
the idea of exploiting relocation [5], which is possible due to
the anycast routing principle. Since a grid/cloud user generally
does not care about the exact location where his workload is
being processed, it could be better to relocate the request to
another resource (different from the one chosen under failure-
free conditions).
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a adjustment
and extension of our previously proposed column-generation
based model [6] for resilient grid/cloud dimensioning with
failure-independent backup routing, in particular to also cover
the case of 1:N server protection; (ii) a new model to solve
the resilient grid/cloud dimensioning problem with failure-
dependent backup routing; and (iii) a comprehensive dis-
cussion of both failure-dependent and failure-independent
rerouting schemes in a fairly large EU-network topology,
outlining the differences between them as well as the effects
of relocating on both network and server resource capacity
requirements. In the next section, we show the relation of these
contributions to current state-of-the-art in research.
II. RELATED WORK
The current paper addresses anycast in optical circuit-
switched (OCS) WDM networks. The anycast routing problem
in such OCS WDM networks amounts to the anycast routing
and wavelength protection (ARWA), finding routes for each
anycast request while e.g., minimizing the total number of
wavelengths used, and/or the load on the links [7]. In [8], that
offline problem for a given set of static traffic is solved in three
subsequent phases: (i) destination decision, (ii) path routing,
and (iii) wavelength assignment. This phased approach is
shown to be outperformed by a heuristic algorithm (based
on simulated annealing and genetic algorithms) in [9]. A
generalized static offline RWA problem, comprising not only
anycast, but also unicast and multicast requests, is described
in [10], where heuristic algorithms are proposed to solve it. A
similar problem is addressed in [11], but the author considers
the joint routing of both unicast and anycast connections, and
proposes a heuristic solution based on Langrangean relaxation.
(Note that [11] also briefly touches on the associated online
routing problem. Heuristic solutions to online anycast routing
in WDM networks are also studied in [12], which proposes
to vary the number of candidate anycast sites over time,
according to time-varying load, and highlights the impact of
physical layer impairments.)
Whereas the above mentioned works addressed the anycast
routing problem in WDM networks to find working paths from
source to one of the candidate anycast destinations, the authors
of [13] extended the problem to also find backup paths. Also,
they considered grooming: traffic granularity is supposed to
be sub-wavelength and hence at intermediate nodes, traffic
flows are re-combined to fill the wavelength channels most
efficiently. They solved the online routing problem using an
algorithm based on an auxiliary graph model, which finds
working and backup routes for a single incoming anycast
request. The offline problem, which we will focus on, is
addressed in [14], which considers the optimization of both
working and shared backup paths of anycast and unicast
demands jointly. The authors consider protection against single
link failures and apply shared path protection.
Note that the above works address the network dimen-
sions (i.e., wavelengths) only. However, we are interested
in grid/cloud scenarios, and hence also want to consider
server resources (for storage and computation). Online routing
approaches taking into account both network and server con-
straints for such a scenario are presented in e.g., [15]. (Note
that we consider a set of independent grid/cloud tasks/requests,
each to be executed individually at one particular data center;
for e.g., online scheduling of multiple interdependent tasks,
see e.g., [16]).
In the current paper, we are addressing the offline dimen-
sioning problem, as first tackled in [17]. In that work, we
proposed a phased approach to determining both network and
server dimensions for an optical grid scenario, without consid-
ering resiliency. A similar problem, but assuming mobile users,
was addressed in [18] to find server locations and amount of
servers for the case of mobile thin client computing.
A problem setting very close to the one studied by us below
is presented in [19]: given a capacitated network, including
servers, determine the placement of content, as well as primary
and backup routing of requests for that content, with a given
maximum number of replicas per content item. Thus, the main
differences between our work and [19] (which only studies
rather small scale problems) boil down to: (i) The candidate
destination of an anycast (content) request in [19] is limited
to a subset of all available data center locations, whereas
we do not consider such limitation (although our model is
fairly straightforward to extend by adding constraints); (ii) To
protect against failures, [19] enforces relocation, whereas in
our default model it is optional (but enforcing is straightfor-
ward); (iii) The focus in [19] is on minimizing used network
resources, where server capacity is only indirectly controlled
by limiting the number of replicas per content item rather than
minimizing/limiting the server capacity.
III. RESILIENT OPTICAL GRIDS/CLOUDS PROBLEM
STATEMENT
For the sake of completeness, we formally recall the prob-
lem statement that we will addres [6]:
Given
• Topology comprising the source sites where traffic orig-
inates, data center sites that are the (candidate) destina-
tions, as well as the optical network interconnecting them;
• Demand stating the amount of traffic originating at each
of the source sites (where a unit demand implies 1 unit of
network capacity, i.e., 1 wavelength, and 1 unit of server
capacity); and
• Survivability requirements specifying the failures that
should be protected against,
Find
• K destination locations, chosen out of the given candi-
date data center sites, where server infrastructure should
be provided;
• Destination sites and routes to follow for all traffic,
originating with given intensity at the various source sites
(where each destination should be one of the K data
center locations);
• Network and server capacity to provide on each of the
links and data center sites;
Such that the latter resource capacity (server and network
resources) is minimized.
To achieve the latter objective, we allow sharing capacity
(wavelengths, servers) for the backup of connections whose
primary resources do not fail simultaneously. Similarly, at each
server site, we install the minimum capacity required to cope
with each one of the considered failure scenarios (as well as
the failure-free case, obviously). Thus, we allow reclaiming of
server and network resources for backup purposes, if they are
no longer used as primary under failure conditions.
We express the survivability requirement through the con-
cept of a shared risk link group (SRLG): a set of resources
(links) that may fail jointly, because of shared dependencies
(e.g., fibre ducts [20]). Links in our model either are optical
network links, or represent the connection to the data center.
Thus, also server failures are modeled as failures of links,
implying that through the SRLG concept we can model both
network and server failures.
The ILP models below jointly determine the network and
server capacities, as well as routes to follow for the anycast
traffic. We assume WDM networks and consider the following
network model, illustrated in Fig. 2:
G = (V,L), directed graph representing an optical
grid/cloud, where V is the node set and L is the set
of (directed) links, where every link has the same
unlimited transport capacity.
V = VSRC∪VNET∪VDST, the set of all nodes indexed by v,
comprising pure OXCs (VNET), data center sites VDST
(with |VDST| = K), and explicitly modeled sources
VSRC.
L = LSRC∪LNET∪LDST, the set comprising all directed
network links, indexed by `, again split into the core
network links LNET interconnecting OXCs, and the
modeled access links LSRC from job sources and
those towards the data center sites LDST.
∆v The number of unit demand requests, originating
from a source node v ∈ VSRC.
S The set of SRLGs, where an individual s ∈ S is a
set of links that can simultaneously fail. Note that
the empty set (∅) will denote the failure free case.
We also will use the following notations:
IN(v) represents the set of incoming links of v ∈ V .
OUT(v) represents the set of outgoing links of v ∈ V .
A. Failure-independent (FID) path rerouting with relocation
Our previous work [6] considered a single backup path for
each unit connection, i.e., we adopted a shared path protection
OXCs form
WDM network
Grid/cloud users
(traffic source)
Data center
(traffic destination)
Fig. 2. Network model of the input data: (i) network links and nodes (OXCs
labeled A-D), (ii) source nodes where traffic originates (represented here as
users), and (iii) candidate data center sites.
concept. Thus, for a given demand unit the alternate path
(possibly to a different destination) under any failure condition
affecting the primary path was always the same. This is gener-
ally known as failure-independent (FID) restoration [20], [21],
which previously also has been described as state-independent
restoration [22], [23].
In previous work [6], [24], we proposed a column generation
based solution for the dimensioning problem in this FID case.
The results in the current work are based on the models
proposed in [6]. Due to space constraints, we here simply point
out our modifications to that model, which pertain to (i) an
extension to cater for 1:N server protection, and (ii) adjusted
constraints in the pricing problem (PP).
The extension (i) results in a change in the restricted master
problem (RMP). To determine the number of servers to install
(whose amount is expressed as w` for ` ∈ LDST), we will
introduce a factor ρ` to account for 1:N server protection.
The latter requires that per N servers, 1 extra is added for
protection, i.e., we need 1+1/N times the total server capacity
that is required to satisfy demand:
ρ` Constant, which will be 1 + 1/N for 1:N server
protection for links ` ∈ LDST, and 1 in any other
case (i.e., for network links ` ∈ LNET, or in case of
no server protection for ` ∈ LDST).
With this definition, equation (4) of [6] becomes:
w` ≥ ρ` ·
(∑
c∈C
piWc`s · zc +
∑
c∈C
piBc`s · zc
)
∀s ∈ S, ∀` /∈ s
(1)
The pricing problem (PP) adjustment (ii) concerns the fact
that therein piW`s is defined to be 1 if both (a) the working path
crosses link `, and (b) this working path remains unaffected by
failure of SRLG s. Equation (10) of [6] does express only (a),
and fails to capture the part (b). Therefore, constraint (10)
of [6] should be replaced with the following, where pW` is a
binary that equals 1 iff the working path crosses link `:
piW`s ≥ pW` − aWs
piW`s ≤ pW`
piW`s ≤ 1− aWs
∀s ∈ S, ∀` /∈ s (2)
Constraint (2) hence enforces that piW`s ≡ pW` ∧ ¬aWs . We
also note that [6] lacked an upper bounding constraint for aWs .
The latter binary variable equals 1 iff (b) holds, translating to
the logical relation aWs ≡
∨
`′∈s
pW`′ , and (12) of [6] should be:
M · aWs ≥
∑
`′∈s
pW`′
aWs ≤
∑
`′∈s
pW`′
∀s ∈ S,with M = |s| (3)
B. Failure-dependent (FD) path rerouting with relocation
The alternative we will consider here is that of failure-
dependent (FD), aka state-dependent, rerouting. To study the
FD case, we make use of a fairly straightforward ILP as
sketched below. Since we did not observe scalability issues
in studying fairly large problems (see Section IV), we did
not resort to column generation as in the FID case [6]. Note
that the ILP for the FD case below assumes that the K best
candidate destination locations have been chosen. This can be
realized through a simple ILP model as described in [17].
In addition to the constants ρ` as defined before in Sec-
tion III-B, we define the following ILP variables:
pv`s The number of unit demands originating from v ∈
VSRC that are crossing link ` ∈ L under failure of
s ∈ S (s = ∅ represents the failure free case).
w` The capacity to provide on link ` ∈ L. For network
links ` ∈ LNET, this amounts to the number of
wavelengths. For data center links ` ∈ LDST this will
represent the number of nodes v ∈ VSRC.
The objective is given in (4): we minimize the amount of
network resources (wavelengths w`) and the amount of server
resources, which in our model is conveniently represented as
the capacity on server links. We introduce a factor α that
expresses the cost ratio of the server capacity corresponding
to a workload filling a single wavelength with data, compared
to the cost of a single wavelength on a single link.
min
( ∑
`∈LNET
w` + α ·
∑
`∈LDST
w`
)
(4)
The first set of constraints constitute the demand constraints
which dictate where traffic originates (5)–(6) and ends (7),
as well as the traditional flow conservation constraint in
intermediate network nodes (8). These constraints have to hold
∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S:
pv`′s = ∆v where {`′} = OUT(v) (5)
pv`s = 0 ∀` ∈ LSRC \ OUT(v) (6)∑
`∈LDST
pv`s = ∆v (7)
∑
`∈IN(v′)
pv`s =
∑
`∈OUT(v′)
pv`s ∀v′ ∈ LNET (8)
The next constraint (9) expresses that traffic cannot cross
affected links for each respective failure scenario:
pv`s = 0 ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S, ∀` ∈ s (9)
The final constraint amounts to counting the capacity re-
quired for each link (or data center):
w` ≥ ρ` ·
∑
v∈VSRC
pv`s ∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S,∀` ∈ LNET ∪ LDST
(10)
The aforementioned equations cover the case of failure-
dependent rerouting, exploiting relocation (if it is beneficial).
To obtain resource dimensions for the non-relocation case,
we need to enforce that for all failure cases the same data
center is chosen as in the failure free case. This implies
∀v ∈ VSRC,∀s ∈ S \ {s′} , s′ = ∅,∀` ∈ LDST:
pv`s = pv`s′ (11)
As a final remark, note that the model defined by (4)–(10)
amounts to optional relocation, i.e., an alternate destination
site will only be chosen if that leads to lower overall costs
as per the objective. In case we want to enforce relocation
under failure conditions (as in [19], we can add the following
constraint1, ∀v ∈ VSRC, ∀` ∈ LDST, s′ = ∅:
(pv`s′ = 0) ∨
 ∑
s∈S\{s′}
pv`s = 0
 (12)
IV. CASE STUDY
Our case study to assess the impact of relocation under
failure-dependent backup routing used the same test network
of [6], i.e., a European network topology composed of 28
nodes and 41 bidirectional links. We compared the following
cases for failure-dependent backup rerouting:
• FD, 1L, NoReloc: Protect against single link failures only,
without relocating, i.e., using model (4)–(11).
• FD, 1L, Reloc: Protect against single link failures only,
exploiting relocation, i.e., using model (4)–(10).
• FD, 1LSN, NoReloc: Protect against single failures of
either links or data center servers (using 1:N protection
for servers), without relocating, i.e., using model (4)–
(11).
• FD, 1LS, Reloc: Protect against single failures of either
links or data center servers, exploiting relocation, i.e.,
using model (4)–(10). To ensure relocation is optional
(meaning that server failures can also be protected by
adding backup servers at the primary location), we fore-
see 2 parallel server links between each data center node
and its corresponding OXC (thus LDST contains twice as
much elements as for the other cases).
The settings for the SRLG set S and the link capacity factors
ρ` in the various failure scenarios are summarized in Table I.
In our results, we consider the case of K = 3 server sites,
where we did not fix the locations a priori (as opposed to [25]).
As pointed out previously, we use the server location ILP
of [17] to choose them, based on the demand. For the latter, we
varied the total number of unit demands (D =
∑
∆v) between
1Note that a constraint of the form (a = 0)∨(b = 0) can be easily modeled
as linear constraints. Let A,B be binary variables, so that A ≡ (a = 0) and
B ≡ (b = 0). Then the ∨ constraint becomes A+B ≥ 1.
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Fig. 3. The resource capacity required in the EU network for α = 1, K = 3, in case of failure dependent (FD) rerouting, using N = 1 for the 1 : N server
protection in the NoReloc 1LSN case. Error bars (which are largely hidden behind data point markers) indicate 90% confidence intervals derived from the
10 random instances per data point. Note that the network capacity is exactly the same for both NoReloc cases.
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Fig. 4. The resource capacity required in the EU network for α = 1, K = 3, in case of failure independent (FID) rerouting, using N = 1 for the 1 : N
server protection in the NoReloc 1LSN case. Error bars (which are largely hidden behind data point markers) indicate 90% confidence intervals derived from
10 random instances per data point. Note that the network capacity is exactly the same for both NoReloc cases.
Table I
MODEL SETTINGS FOR THE CONSIDERED FAILURE SCENARIOS.
Acronym ILP model settings
1L S = {{`, `′} `, `′ ∈ LNET , ` is the reverse of `′} , S1L
ρ` = 1, ∀` ∈ L
1LS S = S1L ∪ {{`} : ` ∈ LDST}
ρ` = 1, ∀` ∈ L
1LSN S = S1L
ρ` = 1 + 1/N if ` ∈ LDST, else 1
10 and 350. For each D, we created 10 random instances. The
measures plotted below are averages over those 10 random
instances per demand case. We set the relative server cost
parameter α = 1.
Let us first look at the results for failure dependent rerouting
(FD), as per our new model of Section III-B. In the case of
protecting against single link failures (1L), we note the clear
advantage of exploiting relocation on network capacity: we
observe a reduction of required number of wavelengths in the
order of 10.7% (average over all D ∈ [10, 350] cases; in line
with our earlier findings for the failure-independent rerouting
case [6]). The price we pay for this reduced network capacity,
is a slight increase in required server capacity (order of +6.4%,
again averaged over our D ∈ [10, 350] cases; with lower values
for higher demand). With our assumed wavelength/server unit
cost ratio of α = 1, and the dominant network resources (cf.
scale difference between Fig. 3(a) and (b)), there is indeed
a net advantage to exploiting relocation. For the case of
protection against both single link or single server failures
(1LS / 1LSN), the advantage continues to hold. We observe in
this case a reduction in total wavelength capacity in the order
of 6% (avg. over all D ∈ [10, 350]). The relocation case (Reloc
1LS) obviously requires additional server capacity compared
to the NoReloc 1L case, but considerably less than adding 1:1
server protection: server capacity reduction achieved by Reloc
1LS compared to NoReloc 1LSN amounts to around 36.5%
(avg. over all D ∈ [10, 350]). Thus, the server cost to realize
protection against link or server failures exploiting relocation
is of the same order as 1:3 server protection without relocation
(but still with a clear reduction of network resources).
Coming now to the difference between failure dependent
(FD) and failure independent (FID) rerouting, we see that
the discussion above continues to hold for the FID case.
Indeed, comparing the respective cases (in terms of exploiting
relocation and server/link protection scenario) for FID versus
FD, we see that obviously FID never outperforms FD. Yet,
deviations, i.e., FID/FD − 1, are quite limited: below 1%
for the NoReloc cases, and around 2% for the Reloc cases (a
difference well below the 90% confidence interval bounds,
cf. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.) Thus, in the considered case of
anycast routing, both with and without exploiting relocation,
the advantage of having backup routes tailored to the particular
failure case (i.e., FD instead of FID) is limited. This is in line
with similar conclusions comparing FD vs. FID rerouting in
cases of simple unicast traffic [20], [23].
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper, and its predecessor [6],
scalable methods to dimension both the network and data
center capacities in an optical grid/cloud context to satisfy
a given (static) set of requests for data center infrastructure
(server capacity) and network connectivity to reach it. We
particularly stress the importance of recognizing the freedom
to choose the exact location of those data centers and the
ones that are chosen to fulfill a particular request. This can
be exploited in the form of so-called relocation to protect
not just against network link, but also data center server
failures: requests can be relocated to alternate data centers
in case of failures. Exploiting relocation brings benefits in
terms of required network capacity (reductions of over 10%
in our case study), and comes at an additional server capacity
cost (compared to failure-free conditions) well below that of
1:1 server protection. In our case study, failure-dependent
(FD) rerouting, where backup routes (and server locations)
may be chosen differently for different failure cases, does
not bring significant benefits compared to failure-independent
(FID) routing with a single backup path and destination for
all failure cases. Our ILP models (which in the FID case are
based on column generation) prove to be quite scalable, given
our case study on a large EU network with up to 350 requests.
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